✍️
Red Teaming Experiments
  • What is this iRed.team?
  • Pinned
    • Pentesting Cheatsheets
      • SQL Injection & XSS Playground
    • Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse
      • From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
      • Kerberoasting
      • Kerberos: Golden Tickets
      • Kerberos: Silver Tickets
      • AS-REP Roasting
      • Kerberoasting: Requesting RC4 Encrypted TGS when AES is Enabled
      • Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Constrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over
      • Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
      • DCShadow - Becoming a Rogue Domain Controller
      • DCSync: Dump Password Hashes from Domain Controller
      • PowerView: Active Directory Enumeration
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
      • Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
      • From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise
      • Pass the Hash with Machine$ Accounts
      • BloodHound with Kali Linux: 101
      • Backdooring AdminSDHolder for Persistence
      • Active Directory Enumeration with AD Module without RSAT or Admin Privileges
      • Enumerating AD Object Permissions with dsacls
      • Active Directory Password Spraying
  • offensive security
    • Red Team Infrastructure
      • HTTP Forwarders / Relays
      • SMTP Forwarders / Relays
      • Phishing with Modlishka Reverse HTTP Proxy
      • Automating Red Team Infrastructure with Terraform
      • Cobalt Strike 101
      • Powershell Empire 101
      • Spiderfoot 101 with Kali using Docker
    • Initial Access
      • Password Spraying Outlook Web Access: Remote Shell
      • Phishing with MS Office
        • Phishing: XLM / Macro 4.0
        • T1173: Phishing - DDE
        • T1137: Phishing - Office Macros
        • Phishing: OLE + LNK
        • Phishing: Embedded Internet Explorer
        • Phishing: .SLK Excel
        • Phishing: Replacing Embedded Video with Bogus Payload
        • Inject Macros from a Remote Dotm Template
        • Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections
        • Phishing: Embedded HTML Forms
      • Phishing with GoPhish and DigitalOcean
      • Forced Authentication
      • NetNTLMv2 hash stealing using Outlook
    • Code Execution
      • T1117: regsvr32
      • T1170: MSHTA
      • T1196: Control Panel Item
      • Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function
      • Code Execution through Control Panel Add-ins
      • T1191: CMSTP
      • T1118: InstallUtil
      • Using MSBuild to Execute Shellcode in C#
      • T1202: Forfiles Indirect Command Execution
      • Application Whitelisting Bypass with WMIC and XSL
      • Powershell Without Powershell.exe
      • Powershell Constrained Language Mode ByPass
      • Forcing Iexplore.exe to Load a Malicious DLL via COM Abuse
      • T1216: pubprn.vbs Signed Script Code Execution
    • Code & Process Injection
      • CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection
      • DLL Injection
      • Reflective DLL Injection
      • Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection
      • Process Doppelganging
      • Loading and Executing Shellcode From PE Resources
      • Process Hollowing and Portable Executable Relocations
      • APC Queue Code Injection
      • Early Bird APC Queue Code Injection
      • Shellcode Execution in a Local Process with QueueUserAPC and NtTestAlert
      • Shellcode Execution through Fibers
      • Shellcode Execution via CreateThreadpoolWait
      • Local Shellcode Execution without Windows APIs
      • Injecting to Remote Process via Thread Hijacking
      • SetWindowHookEx Code Injection
      • Finding Kernel32 Base and Function Addresses in Shellcode
      • Executing Shellcode with Inline Assembly in C/C++
      • Writing Custom Shellcode Encoders and Decoders
      • Backdooring PE Files with Shellcode
      • NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection
      • AddressOfEntryPoint Code Injection without VirtualAllocEx RWX
      • Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
      • PE Injection: Executing PEs inside Remote Processes
      • API Monitoring and Hooking for Offensive Tooling
      • Windows API Hooking
      • Import Adress Table (IAT) Hooking
      • DLL Injection via a Custom .NET Garbage Collector
      • Writing and Compiling Shellcode in C
      • Injecting .NET Assembly to an Unmanaged Process
    • Defense Evasion
      • AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries
      • Evading Windows Defender with 1 Byte Change
      • Bypassing Windows Defender: One TCP Socket Away From Meterpreter and Beacon Sessions
      • Bypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIs
      • Windows API Hashing in Malware
      • Detecting Hooked Syscalls
      • Calling Syscalls Directly from Visual Studio to Bypass AVs/EDRs
      • Retrieving ntdll Syscall Stubs from Disk at Run-time
      • Full DLL Unhooking with C++
      • Enumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code Injection
      • Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads
      • T1027: Obfuscated Powershell Invocations
      • Masquerading Processes in Userland via _PEB
      • Commandline Obfusaction
      • File Smuggling with HTML and JavaScript
      • T1099: Timestomping
      • T1096: Alternate Data Streams
      • T1158: Hidden Files
      • T1140: Encode/Decode Data with Certutil
      • Downloading Files with Certutil
      • T1045: Packed Binaries
      • Unloading Sysmon Driver
      • Bypassing IDS Signatures with Simple Reverse Shells
      • Preventing 3rd Party DLLs from Injecting into your Malware
      • ProcessDynamicCodePolicy: Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)
      • Parent Process ID (PPID) Spoofing
      • Executing C# Assemblies from Jscript and wscript with DotNetToJscript
    • Enumeration and Discovery
      • Windows Event IDs and Others for Situational Awareness
      • Enumerating COM Objects and their Methods
      • Enumerating Users without net, Services without sc and Scheduled Tasks without schtasks
      • Enumerating Windows Domains with rpcclient through SocksProxy == Bypassing Command Line Logging
      • Dump GAL from OWA
      • T1010: Application Window Discovery
      • T1087: Account Discovery & Enumeration
      • Using COM to Enumerate Hostname, Username, Domain, Network Drives
      • Detecting Sysmon on the Victim Host
    • Privilege Escalation
      • T1134: Primary Access Token Manipulation
      • Windows NamedPipes 101 + Privilege Escalation
      • T1038: DLL Hijacking
      • T1108: WebShells
      • T1183: Image File Execution Options Injection
      • Unquoted Service Paths
      • Pass The Hash: Privilege Escalation with Invoke-WMIExec
      • Environment Variable $Path Interception
      • Weak Service Permissions
    • Credential Access & Dumping
      • Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass Without Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass without Mimikatz with MiniDumpWriteDump
      • Dumping Hashes from SAM via Registry
      • Dumping SAM via esentutl.exe
      • Dumping LSA Secrets
      • Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy
      • Network vs Interactive Logons
      • Reading DPAPI Encrypted Secrets with Mimikatz and C++
      • T1214: Credentials in Registry
      • T1174: Password Filter
      • Forcing WDigest to Store Credentials in Plaintext
      • Dumping Delegated Default Kerberos and NTLM Credentials w/o Touching Lsass
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials via Custom Security Support Provider and Authentication Packages
      • Pulling Web Application Passwords by Hooking HTML Input Fields
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials by Hooking msv1_0!SpAcceptCredentials
      • Credentials Collection via CredUIPromptForCredentials
    • Lateral Movement
      • T1028: WinRM for Lateral Movement
      • WinRS for Lateral Movement
      • T1047: WMI for Lateral Movement
      • T1076: RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon
      • T1051: Shared Webroot
      • T1175: Lateral Movement via DCOM
      • WMI + MSI Lateral Movement
      • Lateral Movement via Service Configuration Manager
      • Lateral Movement via SMB Relaying
      • WMI + NewScheduledTaskAction Lateral Movement
      • WMI + PowerShell Desired State Configuration Lateral Movement
      • Simple TCP Relaying with NetCat
      • Empire Shells with NetNLTMv2 Relaying
      • Lateral Movement with Psexec
      • From Beacon to Interactive RDP Session
      • SSH Tunnelling / Port Forwarding
      • Lateral Movement via WMI Event Subscription
      • Lateral Movement via DLL Hijacking
      • Lateral Movement over headless RDP with SharpRDP
      • ShadowMove: Lateral Movement by Duplicating Existing Sockets
    • Persistence
      • DLL Proxying for Persistence
      • T1053: Schtask
      • T1035: Service Execution
      • T1015: Sticky Keys
      • T1136: Create Account
      • T1013: AddMonitor()
      • T1128: NetSh Helper DLL
      • T1084: Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation
        • WMI as a Data Storage
      • Windows Logon Helper
      • Hijacking Default File Extension
      • Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL
      • Modifying .lnk Shortcuts
      • T1180: Screensaver Hijack
      • T1138: Application Shimming
      • T1197: BITS Jobs
      • T1122: COM Hijacking
      • T1198: SIP & Trust Provider Hijacking
      • T1209: Hijacking Time Providers
      • T1130: Installing Root Certificate
      • Powershell Profile Persistence
      • RID Hijacking
      • Word Library Add-Ins
      • Office Templates
    • Exfiltration
      • Powershell Payload Delivery via DNS using Invoke-PowerCloud
  • reversing, forensics & misc
    • Windows Internals
      • Configuring Kernel Debugging Environment with kdnet and WinDBG Preview
      • Compiling a Simple Kernel Driver, DbgPrint, DbgView
      • Loading Windows Kernel Driver for Debugging
      • Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver
      • Listing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses
      • Sending Commands From Your Userland Program to Your Kernel Driver using IOCTL
      • Windows Kernel Drivers 101
      • x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT
      • Interrupt Descriptor Table - IDT
      • Token Abuse for Privilege Escalation in Kernel
      • Manipulating ActiveProcessLinks to Hide Processes in Userland
      • ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101
      • Exploring Injected Threads
      • Parsing PE File Headers with C++
      • Instrumenting Windows APIs with Frida
      • Exploring Process Environment Block
    • Cloud
      • AWS Accounts, Users, Groups, Roles, Policies
    • Neo4j
    • Dump Virtual Box Memory
    • AES Encryption Using Crypto++ .lib in Visual Studio C++
    • Reversing Password Checking Routine
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On this page
  • Overview
  • Walkthrough
  • 1. Compile Service DLL
  • 2. Create EvilSvc Service
  • 3. Modify EvilSvc - Specify ServiceDLL Path
  • 4. Group EvilSvc with DcomLaunch
  • 5. Start EvilSvc Service
  • Detection
  • References

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  1. offensive security
  2. Persistence

Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL

This is a quick lab that looks into a persistence mechanism that relies on installing a new Windows service, that will be hosted by an svchost.exe process.

Overview

At a high level, this is how the technique works:

  1. Create a service EvilSvc.dll DLL (the DLL that will be loaded into an svchost.exe) with the code we want executed on each system reboot

  2. Create a new service EvilSvc with binPath= svchost.exe

  3. Add the ServiceDll value to EvilSvc service and point it to the service DLL compiled in step 1

  4. Modify HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost to specify under which group your service should be loaded into

  5. Start EvilSvc service

  6. The EvilSvc is started and its service DLL EvilSvc.dll is loaded into an svchost.exe

Walkthrough

1. Compile Service DLL

First of, let's compile our service DLL as EvilSvc.dll. This DLL is going to be loaded into an svchost.exe as part of our service EvilSvc that we will register in a second:

#include "pch.h"
#define SVCNAME TEXT("EvilSvc")

SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE serviceStatusHandle;
HANDLE stopEvent = NULL;

VOID UpdateServiceStatus(DWORD currentState)
{
    serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = currentState;
    SetServiceStatus(serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus);
}

DWORD ServiceHandler(DWORD controlCode, DWORD eventType, LPVOID eventData, LPVOID context)
{
    switch (controlCode)
    {
        case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
            serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
            SetEvent(stopEvent);
            break;
        case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
            serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
            SetEvent(stopEvent);
            break;
        case SERVICE_CONTROL_PAUSE:
            serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_PAUSED;
            break;
        case SERVICE_CONTROL_CONTINUE:
            serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
            break;
        case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
            break;
        default:
            break;
    }

    UpdateServiceStatus(SERVICE_RUNNING);

    return NO_ERROR;
}

VOID ExecuteServiceCode()
{
    stopEvent = CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL);
    UpdateServiceStatus(SERVICE_RUNNING);

    // #####################################
    // your persistence code here
    // #####################################

    while (1)
    {
        WaitForSingleObject(stopEvent, INFINITE);
        UpdateServiceStatus(SERVICE_STOPPED);
        return;
    }
}

extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) VOID WINAPI ServiceMain(DWORD argC, LPWSTR * argV)
{
    serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler(SVCNAME, (LPHANDLER_FUNCTION)ServiceHandler);

    serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS;
    serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = 0;

    UpdateServiceStatus(SERVICE_START_PENDING);
    ExecuteServiceCode();
}

2. Create EvilSvc Service

Let's now create a new service called EvilSvc and specify the binPath to be svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch, which will tell Service Control Manager that we want our EvilSvc to be hosted by svchost.exe in a service group called DcomLaunch:

sc.exe create EvilSvc binPath= "c:\windows\System32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch" type= share start= auto

3. Modify EvilSvc - Specify ServiceDLL Path

Next, inside HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\EvilSvc\, create a new value called ServiceDll and point it to the EvilSvc.dll service DLL compiled in step 1:

reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\EvilSvc\Parameters /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\Windows\system32\EvilSvc.dll /f

EvilSvc.dll must exist in C:\Windows\system32\EvilSvc.dll

At this point, our EvilSvc should be created with all the right parameters as seen in the registry:

4. Group EvilSvc with DcomLaunch

As a final step, we need to tell the Service Control Manager under which service group our EvilSvcshould load.

We want it to get loaded in the DcomLaunch group, so we need to add our service name EvilSvc in the list of services in the DcomLaunch value in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost:

5. Start EvilSvc Service

We can now try loading our EvilSvc service:

sc.exe start EvilSvc

EvilSvc is now loaded into svchost.exe as part of a DcomLauncher services group:

Detection

Below are some initial thoughts on how one could start hunting for this technique:

  • Recently created services with svchost.exe as a binpath

  • Listing out ServiceDLL value for all system services and looking for DLLs that are loaded from suspicious locations (i.e non c:\windows\system32): Get-ItemProperty hklm:\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\*\Parameters | ? { $_.servicedll } | select psparentpath, servicedll

References

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Last updated 4 years ago

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