✍️
Red Teaming Experiments
  • What is this iRed.team?
  • Pinned
    • Pentesting Cheatsheets
      • SQL Injection & XSS Playground
    • Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse
      • From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
      • Kerberoasting
      • Kerberos: Golden Tickets
      • Kerberos: Silver Tickets
      • AS-REP Roasting
      • Kerberoasting: Requesting RC4 Encrypted TGS when AES is Enabled
      • Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Constrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over
      • Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
      • DCShadow - Becoming a Rogue Domain Controller
      • DCSync: Dump Password Hashes from Domain Controller
      • PowerView: Active Directory Enumeration
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
      • Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
      • From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise
      • Pass the Hash with Machine$ Accounts
      • BloodHound with Kali Linux: 101
      • Backdooring AdminSDHolder for Persistence
      • Active Directory Enumeration with AD Module without RSAT or Admin Privileges
      • Enumerating AD Object Permissions with dsacls
      • Active Directory Password Spraying
  • offensive security
    • Red Team Infrastructure
      • HTTP Forwarders / Relays
      • SMTP Forwarders / Relays
      • Phishing with Modlishka Reverse HTTP Proxy
      • Automating Red Team Infrastructure with Terraform
      • Cobalt Strike 101
      • Powershell Empire 101
      • Spiderfoot 101 with Kali using Docker
    • Initial Access
      • Password Spraying Outlook Web Access: Remote Shell
      • Phishing with MS Office
        • Phishing: XLM / Macro 4.0
        • T1173: Phishing - DDE
        • T1137: Phishing - Office Macros
        • Phishing: OLE + LNK
        • Phishing: Embedded Internet Explorer
        • Phishing: .SLK Excel
        • Phishing: Replacing Embedded Video with Bogus Payload
        • Inject Macros from a Remote Dotm Template
        • Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections
        • Phishing: Embedded HTML Forms
      • Phishing with GoPhish and DigitalOcean
      • Forced Authentication
      • NetNTLMv2 hash stealing using Outlook
    • Code Execution
      • T1117: regsvr32
      • T1170: MSHTA
      • T1196: Control Panel Item
      • Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function
      • Code Execution through Control Panel Add-ins
      • T1191: CMSTP
      • T1118: InstallUtil
      • Using MSBuild to Execute Shellcode in C#
      • T1202: Forfiles Indirect Command Execution
      • Application Whitelisting Bypass with WMIC and XSL
      • Powershell Without Powershell.exe
      • Powershell Constrained Language Mode ByPass
      • Forcing Iexplore.exe to Load a Malicious DLL via COM Abuse
      • T1216: pubprn.vbs Signed Script Code Execution
    • Code & Process Injection
      • CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection
      • DLL Injection
      • Reflective DLL Injection
      • Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection
      • Process Doppelganging
      • Loading and Executing Shellcode From PE Resources
      • Process Hollowing and Portable Executable Relocations
      • APC Queue Code Injection
      • Early Bird APC Queue Code Injection
      • Shellcode Execution in a Local Process with QueueUserAPC and NtTestAlert
      • Shellcode Execution through Fibers
      • Shellcode Execution via CreateThreadpoolWait
      • Local Shellcode Execution without Windows APIs
      • Injecting to Remote Process via Thread Hijacking
      • SetWindowHookEx Code Injection
      • Finding Kernel32 Base and Function Addresses in Shellcode
      • Executing Shellcode with Inline Assembly in C/C++
      • Writing Custom Shellcode Encoders and Decoders
      • Backdooring PE Files with Shellcode
      • NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection
      • AddressOfEntryPoint Code Injection without VirtualAllocEx RWX
      • Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
      • PE Injection: Executing PEs inside Remote Processes
      • API Monitoring and Hooking for Offensive Tooling
      • Windows API Hooking
      • Import Adress Table (IAT) Hooking
      • DLL Injection via a Custom .NET Garbage Collector
      • Writing and Compiling Shellcode in C
      • Injecting .NET Assembly to an Unmanaged Process
    • Defense Evasion
      • AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries
      • Evading Windows Defender with 1 Byte Change
      • Bypassing Windows Defender: One TCP Socket Away From Meterpreter and Beacon Sessions
      • Bypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIs
      • Windows API Hashing in Malware
      • Detecting Hooked Syscalls
      • Calling Syscalls Directly from Visual Studio to Bypass AVs/EDRs
      • Retrieving ntdll Syscall Stubs from Disk at Run-time
      • Full DLL Unhooking with C++
      • Enumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code Injection
      • Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads
      • T1027: Obfuscated Powershell Invocations
      • Masquerading Processes in Userland via _PEB
      • Commandline Obfusaction
      • File Smuggling with HTML and JavaScript
      • T1099: Timestomping
      • T1096: Alternate Data Streams
      • T1158: Hidden Files
      • T1140: Encode/Decode Data with Certutil
      • Downloading Files with Certutil
      • T1045: Packed Binaries
      • Unloading Sysmon Driver
      • Bypassing IDS Signatures with Simple Reverse Shells
      • Preventing 3rd Party DLLs from Injecting into your Malware
      • ProcessDynamicCodePolicy: Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)
      • Parent Process ID (PPID) Spoofing
      • Executing C# Assemblies from Jscript and wscript with DotNetToJscript
    • Enumeration and Discovery
      • Windows Event IDs and Others for Situational Awareness
      • Enumerating COM Objects and their Methods
      • Enumerating Users without net, Services without sc and Scheduled Tasks without schtasks
      • Enumerating Windows Domains with rpcclient through SocksProxy == Bypassing Command Line Logging
      • Dump GAL from OWA
      • T1010: Application Window Discovery
      • T1087: Account Discovery & Enumeration
      • Using COM to Enumerate Hostname, Username, Domain, Network Drives
      • Detecting Sysmon on the Victim Host
    • Privilege Escalation
      • T1134: Primary Access Token Manipulation
      • Windows NamedPipes 101 + Privilege Escalation
      • T1038: DLL Hijacking
      • T1108: WebShells
      • T1183: Image File Execution Options Injection
      • Unquoted Service Paths
      • Pass The Hash: Privilege Escalation with Invoke-WMIExec
      • Environment Variable $Path Interception
      • Weak Service Permissions
    • Credential Access & Dumping
      • Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass Without Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass without Mimikatz with MiniDumpWriteDump
      • Dumping Hashes from SAM via Registry
      • Dumping SAM via esentutl.exe
      • Dumping LSA Secrets
      • Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy
      • Network vs Interactive Logons
      • Reading DPAPI Encrypted Secrets with Mimikatz and C++
      • T1214: Credentials in Registry
      • T1174: Password Filter
      • Forcing WDigest to Store Credentials in Plaintext
      • Dumping Delegated Default Kerberos and NTLM Credentials w/o Touching Lsass
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials via Custom Security Support Provider and Authentication Packages
      • Pulling Web Application Passwords by Hooking HTML Input Fields
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials by Hooking msv1_0!SpAcceptCredentials
      • Credentials Collection via CredUIPromptForCredentials
    • Lateral Movement
      • T1028: WinRM for Lateral Movement
      • WinRS for Lateral Movement
      • T1047: WMI for Lateral Movement
      • T1076: RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon
      • T1051: Shared Webroot
      • T1175: Lateral Movement via DCOM
      • WMI + MSI Lateral Movement
      • Lateral Movement via Service Configuration Manager
      • Lateral Movement via SMB Relaying
      • WMI + NewScheduledTaskAction Lateral Movement
      • WMI + PowerShell Desired State Configuration Lateral Movement
      • Simple TCP Relaying with NetCat
      • Empire Shells with NetNLTMv2 Relaying
      • Lateral Movement with Psexec
      • From Beacon to Interactive RDP Session
      • SSH Tunnelling / Port Forwarding
      • Lateral Movement via WMI Event Subscription
      • Lateral Movement via DLL Hijacking
      • Lateral Movement over headless RDP with SharpRDP
      • ShadowMove: Lateral Movement by Duplicating Existing Sockets
    • Persistence
      • DLL Proxying for Persistence
      • T1053: Schtask
      • T1035: Service Execution
      • T1015: Sticky Keys
      • T1136: Create Account
      • T1013: AddMonitor()
      • T1128: NetSh Helper DLL
      • T1084: Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation
        • WMI as a Data Storage
      • Windows Logon Helper
      • Hijacking Default File Extension
      • Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL
      • Modifying .lnk Shortcuts
      • T1180: Screensaver Hijack
      • T1138: Application Shimming
      • T1197: BITS Jobs
      • T1122: COM Hijacking
      • T1198: SIP & Trust Provider Hijacking
      • T1209: Hijacking Time Providers
      • T1130: Installing Root Certificate
      • Powershell Profile Persistence
      • RID Hijacking
      • Word Library Add-Ins
      • Office Templates
    • Exfiltration
      • Powershell Payload Delivery via DNS using Invoke-PowerCloud
  • reversing, forensics & misc
    • Windows Internals
      • Configuring Kernel Debugging Environment with kdnet and WinDBG Preview
      • Compiling a Simple Kernel Driver, DbgPrint, DbgView
      • Loading Windows Kernel Driver for Debugging
      • Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver
      • Listing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses
      • Sending Commands From Your Userland Program to Your Kernel Driver using IOCTL
      • Windows Kernel Drivers 101
      • x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT
      • Interrupt Descriptor Table - IDT
      • Token Abuse for Privilege Escalation in Kernel
      • Manipulating ActiveProcessLinks to Hide Processes in Userland
      • ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101
      • Exploring Injected Threads
      • Parsing PE File Headers with C++
      • Instrumenting Windows APIs with Frida
      • Exploring Process Environment Block
    • Cloud
      • AWS Accounts, Users, Groups, Roles, Policies
    • Neo4j
    • Dump Virtual Box Memory
    • AES Encryption Using Crypto++ .lib in Visual Studio C++
    • Reversing Password Checking Routine
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On this page
  • What is SSDT
  • In Human Terms
  • Service Descriptor Table
  • Finding a Dispatch Routine for a Given Userland Syscall
  • Finding Address of All SSDT Routines
  • References

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  1. reversing, forensics & misc
  2. Windows Internals

System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT

Previousx64 Calling Convention: Stack FrameNextInterrupt Descriptor Table - IDT

Last updated 4 years ago

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What is SSDT

System Service Dispatch Table or SSDT, simply is an array of addresses to kernel routines for 32 bit operating systems or an array of relative offsets to the same routines for 64 bit operating systems.

SSDT is the first member of the Service Descriptor Table kernel memory structure as shown below:

typedef struct tagSERVICE_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE {
    SYSTEM_SERVICE_TABLE nt; //effectively a pointer to Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) itself
    SYSTEM_SERVICE_TABLE win32k;
    SYSTEM_SERVICE_TABLE sst3; //pointer to a memory address that contains how many routines are defined in the table
    SYSTEM_SERVICE_TABLE sst4;
} SERVICE_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE;

SSDTs used to be hooked by AVs as well as rootkits that wanted to hide files, registry keys, network connections, etc. Microsoft introduced PatchGuard for x64 systems to fight SSDT modifications by BSOD'ing the system.

In Human Terms

When a program in user space calls a function, say CreateFile, eventually code execution is transfered to ntdll!NtCreateFile and via a syscall to the kernel routine nt!NtCreateFile.

Syscall is merely an index in the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) which contains an array of pointers for 32 bit OS'es (or relative offsets to the Service Dispatch Table for 64 bit OSes) to all critical system APIs like ZwCreateFile, ZwOpenFile and so on..

Below is a simplified diagram that shows how offsets in SSDT KiServiceTable are converted to absolute addresses of corresponding kernel routines:

Effectively, syscalls and SSDT (KiServiceTable) work togeher as a bridge between userland API calls and their corresponding kernel routines, allowing the kernel to know which routine should be executed for a given syscall that originated in the user space.

Service Descriptor Table

In WinDBG, we can check the Service Descriptor Table structure KeServiceDescriptorTable as shown below. Note that the first member is recognized as KiServiceTable - this is a pointer to the SSDT itself - the dispatch table (or simply an array) containing all those pointers/offsets:

0: kd> dps nt!keservicedescriptortable L4
fffff801`9210b880  fffff801`9203b470 nt!KiServiceTable
fffff801`9210b888  00000000`00000000
fffff801`9210b890  00000000`000001ce
fffff801`9210b898  fffff801`9203bbac nt!KiArgumentTable

Let's try and print out a couple of values from the SSDT:

0: kd> dd /c1 KiServiceTable L2
fffff801`9203b470  fd9007c4
fffff801`9203b474  fcb485c0

As mentioned earlier, on x64 which is what I'm running in my lab, SSDT contains relative offsets to kernel routines. In order to get the absolute address for a given offset, the following formula needs to be applied:

RoutineAbsoluteAddress=KiServiceTableAddress+(routineOffset>>>4)RoutineAbsoluteAddress = KiServiceTableAddress + (routineOffset >>> 4)RoutineAbsoluteAddress=KiServiceTableAddress+(routineOffset>>>4)

Using the above formula and the first offset fd9007c4 we got from the KiServiceTable, we can work out that this offset is pointing to nt!NtAccessCheck:

0: kd> u KiServiceTable + (0xfd9007c4 >>> 4)
nt!NtAccessCheck:
fffff801`91dcb4ec 4c8bdc          mov     r11,rsp
fffff801`91dcb4ef 4883ec68        sub     rsp,68h
fffff801`91dcb4f3 488b8424a8000000 mov     rax,qword ptr [rsp+0A8h]
fffff801`91dcb4fb 4533d2          xor     r10d,r10d

We can confirm it if we try to disassemble the nt!NtAccessCheck - routine addresses (fffff801`91dcb4ec) and first instructions (mov r11, rsp) of the above and below commands match:

0: kd> u nt!NtAccessCheck L1
nt!NtAccessCheck:
fffff801`91dcb4ec 4c8bdc          mov     r11,rsp

If we refer back to the original drawing on how SSDT offsets are converted to absolute addresses, we can redraw it with specific values for syscall 0x1:

Finding a Dispatch Routine for a Given Userland Syscall

As a simple exercise, given a known syscall number, we can try to work out what kernel routine will be called once that syscall is issued. Let's load the debugging symbols for ntdll module:

.reload /f ntdll.dll
lm ntdll

Let's now find the syscall for ntdll!NtCreateFile:

0: kd> u ntdll!ntcreatefile L2

...we can see the syscall is 0x55:

Offsets in the KiServiceTable are 4 bytes in size, so we can work out the offset for syscall 0x55 by looking into the value the KiServiceTable holds at position 0x55:

0: kd> dd /c1 kiservicetable+4*0x55 L1
fffff801`9203b5c4  01fa3007

We see from the above that the offset for NtCreateFile is 01fa3007. Using the formula discussed previously for working out the absolute routine address, we confirm that we're looking at the nt!tCreateFile kernel routine that will be called once ntdll!NtCreateFile issues the 0x55 syscall:

0: kd> u kiservicetable + (01fa3007>>>4) L1
nt!NtCreateFile:
fffff801`92235770 4881ec88000000  sub     rsp,88h

Let's redraw the earlier diagram once more for the syscall 0x55 for ntdll!NtCreateFile:

Finding Address of All SSDT Routines

As another exercise, we could loop through all items in the service dispatch table and print absolute addresses for all routines defined in the dispatch table:

.foreach /ps 1 /pS 1 ( offset {dd /c 1 nt!KiServiceTable L poi(keservicedescriptortable+0x10) }){ dp kiservicetable + ( offset >>> 4 ) L1 }

Nice, but not very human readable. We can update the loop a bit and print out the API names associated with those absolute addresses:

0: kd> .foreach /ps 1 /pS 1 ( offset {dd /c 1 nt!KiServiceTable L poi(nt!KeServiceDescriptorTable+10)}){ r $t0 = ( offset >>> 4) + nt!KiServiceTable; .printf "%p - %y\n", $t0, $t0 }
fffff80191dcb4ec - nt!NtAccessCheck (fffff801`91dcb4ec)
fffff80191cefccc - nt!NtWorkerFactoryWorkerReady (fffff801`91cefccc)
fffff8019218df1c - nt!NtAcceptConnectPort (fffff801`9218df1c)
fffff801923f8848 - nt!NtMapUserPhysicalPagesScatter (fffff801`923f8848)
fffff801921afc10 - nt!NtWaitForSingleObject (fffff801`921afc10)
fffff80191e54010 - nt!NtCallbackReturn (fffff801`91e54010)
fffff8019213cf60 - nt!NtReadFile (fffff801`9213cf60)
fffff801921b2e80 - nt!NtDeviceIoControlFile (fffff801`921b2e80)
fffff80192212dc0 - nt!NtWriteFile (fffff801`92212dc0)
.....cut for brewity.....

References

.foreach (WinDbg) - Windows driversdocsmsft
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The Quest for the SSDTsCodeProject
.printf (WinDbg) - Windows driversdocsmsft
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