✍️
Red Teaming Experiments
  • What is this iRed.team?
  • Pinned
    • Pentesting Cheatsheets
      • SQL Injection & XSS Playground
    • Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse
      • From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
      • Kerberoasting
      • Kerberos: Golden Tickets
      • Kerberos: Silver Tickets
      • AS-REP Roasting
      • Kerberoasting: Requesting RC4 Encrypted TGS when AES is Enabled
      • Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Constrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over
      • Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
      • DCShadow - Becoming a Rogue Domain Controller
      • DCSync: Dump Password Hashes from Domain Controller
      • PowerView: Active Directory Enumeration
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
      • Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
      • From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise
      • Pass the Hash with Machine$ Accounts
      • BloodHound with Kali Linux: 101
      • Backdooring AdminSDHolder for Persistence
      • Active Directory Enumeration with AD Module without RSAT or Admin Privileges
      • Enumerating AD Object Permissions with dsacls
      • Active Directory Password Spraying
  • offensive security
    • Red Team Infrastructure
      • HTTP Forwarders / Relays
      • SMTP Forwarders / Relays
      • Phishing with Modlishka Reverse HTTP Proxy
      • Automating Red Team Infrastructure with Terraform
      • Cobalt Strike 101
      • Powershell Empire 101
      • Spiderfoot 101 with Kali using Docker
    • Initial Access
      • Password Spraying Outlook Web Access: Remote Shell
      • Phishing with MS Office
        • Phishing: XLM / Macro 4.0
        • T1173: Phishing - DDE
        • T1137: Phishing - Office Macros
        • Phishing: OLE + LNK
        • Phishing: Embedded Internet Explorer
        • Phishing: .SLK Excel
        • Phishing: Replacing Embedded Video with Bogus Payload
        • Inject Macros from a Remote Dotm Template
        • Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections
        • Phishing: Embedded HTML Forms
      • Phishing with GoPhish and DigitalOcean
      • Forced Authentication
      • NetNTLMv2 hash stealing using Outlook
    • Code Execution
      • T1117: regsvr32
      • T1170: MSHTA
      • T1196: Control Panel Item
      • Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function
      • Code Execution through Control Panel Add-ins
      • T1191: CMSTP
      • T1118: InstallUtil
      • Using MSBuild to Execute Shellcode in C#
      • T1202: Forfiles Indirect Command Execution
      • Application Whitelisting Bypass with WMIC and XSL
      • Powershell Without Powershell.exe
      • Powershell Constrained Language Mode ByPass
      • Forcing Iexplore.exe to Load a Malicious DLL via COM Abuse
      • T1216: pubprn.vbs Signed Script Code Execution
    • Code & Process Injection
      • CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection
      • DLL Injection
      • Reflective DLL Injection
      • Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection
      • Process Doppelganging
      • Loading and Executing Shellcode From PE Resources
      • Process Hollowing and Portable Executable Relocations
      • APC Queue Code Injection
      • Early Bird APC Queue Code Injection
      • Shellcode Execution in a Local Process with QueueUserAPC and NtTestAlert
      • Shellcode Execution through Fibers
      • Shellcode Execution via CreateThreadpoolWait
      • Local Shellcode Execution without Windows APIs
      • Injecting to Remote Process via Thread Hijacking
      • SetWindowHookEx Code Injection
      • Finding Kernel32 Base and Function Addresses in Shellcode
      • Executing Shellcode with Inline Assembly in C/C++
      • Writing Custom Shellcode Encoders and Decoders
      • Backdooring PE Files with Shellcode
      • NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection
      • AddressOfEntryPoint Code Injection without VirtualAllocEx RWX
      • Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
      • PE Injection: Executing PEs inside Remote Processes
      • API Monitoring and Hooking for Offensive Tooling
      • Windows API Hooking
      • Import Adress Table (IAT) Hooking
      • DLL Injection via a Custom .NET Garbage Collector
      • Writing and Compiling Shellcode in C
      • Injecting .NET Assembly to an Unmanaged Process
    • Defense Evasion
      • AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries
      • Evading Windows Defender with 1 Byte Change
      • Bypassing Windows Defender: One TCP Socket Away From Meterpreter and Beacon Sessions
      • Bypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIs
      • Windows API Hashing in Malware
      • Detecting Hooked Syscalls
      • Calling Syscalls Directly from Visual Studio to Bypass AVs/EDRs
      • Retrieving ntdll Syscall Stubs from Disk at Run-time
      • Full DLL Unhooking with C++
      • Enumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code Injection
      • Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads
      • T1027: Obfuscated Powershell Invocations
      • Masquerading Processes in Userland via _PEB
      • Commandline Obfusaction
      • File Smuggling with HTML and JavaScript
      • T1099: Timestomping
      • T1096: Alternate Data Streams
      • T1158: Hidden Files
      • T1140: Encode/Decode Data with Certutil
      • Downloading Files with Certutil
      • T1045: Packed Binaries
      • Unloading Sysmon Driver
      • Bypassing IDS Signatures with Simple Reverse Shells
      • Preventing 3rd Party DLLs from Injecting into your Malware
      • ProcessDynamicCodePolicy: Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)
      • Parent Process ID (PPID) Spoofing
      • Executing C# Assemblies from Jscript and wscript with DotNetToJscript
    • Enumeration and Discovery
      • Windows Event IDs and Others for Situational Awareness
      • Enumerating COM Objects and their Methods
      • Enumerating Users without net, Services without sc and Scheduled Tasks without schtasks
      • Enumerating Windows Domains with rpcclient through SocksProxy == Bypassing Command Line Logging
      • Dump GAL from OWA
      • T1010: Application Window Discovery
      • T1087: Account Discovery & Enumeration
      • Using COM to Enumerate Hostname, Username, Domain, Network Drives
      • Detecting Sysmon on the Victim Host
    • Privilege Escalation
      • T1134: Primary Access Token Manipulation
      • Windows NamedPipes 101 + Privilege Escalation
      • T1038: DLL Hijacking
      • T1108: WebShells
      • T1183: Image File Execution Options Injection
      • Unquoted Service Paths
      • Pass The Hash: Privilege Escalation with Invoke-WMIExec
      • Environment Variable $Path Interception
      • Weak Service Permissions
    • Credential Access & Dumping
      • Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass Without Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass without Mimikatz with MiniDumpWriteDump
      • Dumping Hashes from SAM via Registry
      • Dumping SAM via esentutl.exe
      • Dumping LSA Secrets
      • Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy
      • Network vs Interactive Logons
      • Reading DPAPI Encrypted Secrets with Mimikatz and C++
      • T1214: Credentials in Registry
      • T1174: Password Filter
      • Forcing WDigest to Store Credentials in Plaintext
      • Dumping Delegated Default Kerberos and NTLM Credentials w/o Touching Lsass
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials via Custom Security Support Provider and Authentication Packages
      • Pulling Web Application Passwords by Hooking HTML Input Fields
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials by Hooking msv1_0!SpAcceptCredentials
      • Credentials Collection via CredUIPromptForCredentials
    • Lateral Movement
      • T1028: WinRM for Lateral Movement
      • WinRS for Lateral Movement
      • T1047: WMI for Lateral Movement
      • T1076: RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon
      • T1051: Shared Webroot
      • T1175: Lateral Movement via DCOM
      • WMI + MSI Lateral Movement
      • Lateral Movement via Service Configuration Manager
      • Lateral Movement via SMB Relaying
      • WMI + NewScheduledTaskAction Lateral Movement
      • WMI + PowerShell Desired State Configuration Lateral Movement
      • Simple TCP Relaying with NetCat
      • Empire Shells with NetNLTMv2 Relaying
      • Lateral Movement with Psexec
      • From Beacon to Interactive RDP Session
      • SSH Tunnelling / Port Forwarding
      • Lateral Movement via WMI Event Subscription
      • Lateral Movement via DLL Hijacking
      • Lateral Movement over headless RDP with SharpRDP
      • ShadowMove: Lateral Movement by Duplicating Existing Sockets
    • Persistence
      • DLL Proxying for Persistence
      • T1053: Schtask
      • T1035: Service Execution
      • T1015: Sticky Keys
      • T1136: Create Account
      • T1013: AddMonitor()
      • T1128: NetSh Helper DLL
      • T1084: Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation
        • WMI as a Data Storage
      • Windows Logon Helper
      • Hijacking Default File Extension
      • Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL
      • Modifying .lnk Shortcuts
      • T1180: Screensaver Hijack
      • T1138: Application Shimming
      • T1197: BITS Jobs
      • T1122: COM Hijacking
      • T1198: SIP & Trust Provider Hijacking
      • T1209: Hijacking Time Providers
      • T1130: Installing Root Certificate
      • Powershell Profile Persistence
      • RID Hijacking
      • Word Library Add-Ins
      • Office Templates
    • Exfiltration
      • Powershell Payload Delivery via DNS using Invoke-PowerCloud
  • reversing, forensics & misc
    • Windows Internals
      • Configuring Kernel Debugging Environment with kdnet and WinDBG Preview
      • Compiling a Simple Kernel Driver, DbgPrint, DbgView
      • Loading Windows Kernel Driver for Debugging
      • Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver
      • Listing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses
      • Sending Commands From Your Userland Program to Your Kernel Driver using IOCTL
      • Windows Kernel Drivers 101
      • x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT
      • Interrupt Descriptor Table - IDT
      • Token Abuse for Privilege Escalation in Kernel
      • Manipulating ActiveProcessLinks to Hide Processes in Userland
      • ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101
      • Exploring Injected Threads
      • Parsing PE File Headers with C++
      • Instrumenting Windows APIs with Frida
      • Exploring Process Environment Block
    • Cloud
      • AWS Accounts, Users, Groups, Roles, Policies
    • Neo4j
    • Dump Virtual Box Memory
    • AES Encryption Using Crypto++ .lib in Visual Studio C++
    • Reversing Password Checking Routine
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On this page
  • PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine
  • PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine
  • PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine
  • PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx
  • Code
  • References

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  1. reversing, forensics & misc
  2. Windows Internals

Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver

PreviousLoading Windows Kernel Driver for DebuggingNextListing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses

Last updated 4 years ago

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This is a quick lab to play with some of the interesting notifications that kernel drivers can subscribe to:

  • - notifies the driver about new/terminated processes

  • - notifies the driver about new processes being created, allows to kill them before they can run

  • - notifies the driver about new/terminated threads

  • - notifies the driver about DLLs loaded by processes

PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine

PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine takes two parameters:

NTSTATUS PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(
  // pointer to a function to be called when a process is spawned or terminated
  PCREATE_PROCESS_NOTIFY_ROUTINE NotifyRoutine,
  // specifies whether to subscribe or unsubscribe from this event
  BOOLEAN                        Remove
);

Below is a snippet that shows how the routine sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine (line 2) gets registered for new/terminated process notifications on line 24:

// handle incoming notifications about new/terminated processes
void sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(HANDLE ppid, HANDLE pid, BOOLEAN create)
{
    if (create)
    {
        PEPROCESS process = NULL;
        PUNICODE_STRING parentProcessName = NULL, processName = NULL;

        PsLookupProcessByProcessId(ppid, &process);
        SeLocateProcessImageName(process, &parentProcessName);

        PsLookupProcessByProcessId(pid, &process);
        SeLocateProcessImageName(process, &processName);

        DbgPrint("%d %wZ\n\t\t%d %wZ", ppid, parentProcessName, pid, processName);
    }
    else
    {
        DbgPrint("Process %d lost child %d", ppid, pid);
    }
}

// register sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine function to receive notifications about new/terminated processes
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, FALSE);

Below shows how the routine sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine gets executed when a new process hostname.exe (PID 2892) is spawned by powershell (PID 7176). Additionally, it shows that the process 7176 (hostname) terminated:

PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine

PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine only takes one parameter - a pointer to a function that will handle notifications about DLLs that processes running on the system loaded:

NTSTATUS PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine(
  PLOAD_IMAGE_NOTIFY_ROUTINE NotifyRoutine
);

Below indicates that the routine sLoadImageNotifyRoutine is going to handle our notifications as registered with PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine on line 14:

// handle incoming notifications about module loads
void sLoadImageNotifyRoutine(PUNICODE_STRING imageName,    HANDLE pid, PIMAGE_INFO imageInfo)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(imageInfo);
    PEPROCESS process = NULL;
    PUNICODE_STRING processName = NULL;
    PsLookupProcessByProcessId(pid, &process);
    SeLocateProcessImageName(process, &processName);

    DbgPrint("%wZ (%d) loaded %wZ", processName, pid, imageName);
}

// register sLoadImageNotifyRoutinefunction to receive notifications new DLLs being loaded to processes
PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine(sLoadImageNotifyRoutine);

Testing the driver - once we open a notepad.exe, our driver gets notified about all the modules that notepad.exe loaded:

PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine

PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine only takes one parameter - a pointer to a function that will handle notifications about new or killed threads across all the system processes:

NTSTATUS PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine(
  PCREATE_THREAD_NOTIFY_ROUTINE NotifyRoutine
);

Below indicates that the routine sCreateThreadNotifyRoutine is going to handle our notifications as registered with PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine on line 15:

// handle incoming notifications about new/terminated processes
void sCreateThreadNotifyRoutine(HANDLE pid, HANDLE tid, BOOLEAN create)
{
    if (create)
    {
        DbgPrint("%d created thread %d", pid, tid);
    }
    else
    {
        DbgPrint("Thread %d of process %d exited", tid, pid);
    }
}

// register sCreateThreadNotifyRoutine to receive notifications about thread creation / termination
PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine(sCreateThreadNotifyRoutine);

Testing the driver now, we can see we are indeed geting notified about new and terminated threads across processes on our system:

PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx

PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx takes two arguments:

NTSTATUS PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx(
  // pointer to a function to be called when a process is spawned 
  PCREATE_PROCESS_NOTIFY_ROUTINE_EX NotifyRoutine,
  // specifies whether to subscribe or unsubscribe from this event
  BOOLEAN                           Remove
);

Below is a snippet that shows how the routine sCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx (line 3) gets registered for new process notifications on line 19. Processes with commandline containing notepad in them will be killed by setting the createInfo.reationStatus member to STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (line 13):

// handle incoming notifications about new/terminated processes and kill
// processes that have "notepad" in their commandline arguments
void sCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx(PEPROCESS process, HANDLE pid, PPS_CREATE_NOTIFY_INFO createInfo)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(process);
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pid);

    if (createInfo != NULL)
    {
        if (wcsstr(createInfo->CommandLine->Buffer, L"notepad") != NULL)
        {
            DbgPrint("[!] Access to launch notepad.exe was denied!");
            createInfo->CreationStatus = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
        }
    }
}

// subscribe sCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx to new / terminated process notifications
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx(sCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx, FALSE);

If PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx is not working in your driver, you will need to add a /integritycheck switch in your linker configuration

Below shows how an attempt to spawn notepad.exe is blocked by our driver:

Code

Belos is the full working driver code that registers all the callback routines mentioned above:

#include <Ntifs.h>
#include <ntddk.h>
#include <wdm.h>

DRIVER_DISPATCH HandleCustomIOCTL;
#define IOCTL_SPOTLESS CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x2049, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
UNICODE_STRING DEVICE_NAME = RTL_CONSTANT_STRING(L"\\Device\\SpotlessDevice");
UNICODE_STRING DEVICE_SYMBOLIC_NAME = RTL_CONSTANT_STRING(L"\\??\\SpotlessDeviceLink");

void sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(HANDLE ppid, HANDLE pid, BOOLEAN create)
{
    if (create)
    {
        PEPROCESS process = NULL;
        PUNICODE_STRING parentProcessName = NULL, processName = NULL;

        PsLookupProcessByProcessId(ppid, &process);
        SeLocateProcessImageName(process, &parentProcessName);

        PsLookupProcessByProcessId(pid, &process);
        SeLocateProcessImageName(process, &processName);

        DbgPrint("%d %wZ\n\t\t%d %wZ", ppid, parentProcessName, pid, processName);
    }
    else
    {
        DbgPrint("Process %d lost child %d", ppid, pid);
    }
}

void sCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx(PEPROCESS process, HANDLE pid, PPS_CREATE_NOTIFY_INFO createInfo)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(process);
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(pid);

    if (createInfo != NULL)
    {
        if (wcsstr(createInfo->CommandLine->Buffer, L"notepad") != NULL)
        {
            DbgPrint("[!] Access to launch notepad.exe was denied!");
            createInfo->CreationStatus = STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
        }
    }
}

void sLoadImageNotifyRoutine(PUNICODE_STRING imageName,    HANDLE pid, PIMAGE_INFO imageInfo)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(imageInfo);
    PEPROCESS process = NULL;
    PUNICODE_STRING processName = NULL;
    PsLookupProcessByProcessId(pid, &process);
    SeLocateProcessImageName(process, &processName);

    DbgPrint("%wZ (%d) loaded %wZ", processName, pid, imageName);
}

void sCreateThreadNotifyRoutine(HANDLE pid, HANDLE tid, BOOLEAN create)
{
    if (create)
    {
        DbgPrint("%d created thread %d", pid, tid);
    }
    else
    {
        DbgPrint("Thread %d of process %d exited", tid, pid);
    }
}

void DriverUnload(PDRIVER_OBJECT dob)
{
    DbgPrint("Driver unloaded, deleting symbolic links and devices");
    IoDeleteDevice(dob->DeviceObject);
    IoDeleteSymbolicLink(&DEVICE_SYMBOLIC_NAME);
    PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, TRUE);
    PsRemoveLoadImageNotifyRoutine(sLoadImageNotifyRoutine);
    PsRemoveCreateThreadNotifyRoutine(sCreateThreadNotifyRoutine);
    PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx(sCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx, TRUE);
}

NTSTATUS HandleCustomIOCTL(PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, PIRP Irp)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(DeviceObject);
    PIO_STACK_LOCATION stackLocation = NULL;
    CHAR *messageFromKernel = "ohai from them kernelz";

    stackLocation = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(Irp);

    if (stackLocation->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode == IOCTL_SPOTLESS)
    {
        DbgPrint("IOCTL_SPOTLESS (0x%x) issued", stackLocation->Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode);
        DbgPrint("Input received from userland: %s", (char*)Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer);
    }

    Irp->IoStatus.Information = strlen(messageFromKernel);
    Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;

    DbgPrint("Sending to userland: %s", messageFromKernel);
    RtlCopyMemory(Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer, messageFromKernel, strlen(Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer));

    IoCompleteRequest(Irp, IO_NO_INCREMENT);

    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

NTSTATUS MajorFunctions(PDEVICE_OBJECT DeviceObject, PIRP Irp)
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(DeviceObject);

    PIO_STACK_LOCATION stackLocation = NULL;
    stackLocation = IoGetCurrentIrpStackLocation(Irp);

    switch (stackLocation->MajorFunction)
    {
    case IRP_MJ_CREATE:
        DbgPrint("Handle to symbolink link %wZ opened", DEVICE_SYMBOLIC_NAME);
        break;
    case IRP_MJ_CLOSE:
        DbgPrint("Handle to symbolink link %wZ closed", DEVICE_SYMBOLIC_NAME);
        break;
    default:
        break;
    }

    Irp->IoStatus.Information = 0;
    Irp->IoStatus.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
    IoCompleteRequest(Irp, IO_NO_INCREMENT);

    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

NTSTATUS DriverEntry(PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject, PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath) 
{
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(DriverObject);
    UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(RegistryPath);

    NTSTATUS status    = 0;

    // routine that will execute when our driver is unloaded/service is stopped
    DriverObject->DriverUnload = DriverUnload;

    // routine for handling IO requests from userland
    DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL] = HandleCustomIOCTL;

    // routines that will execute once a handle to our device's symbolik link is opened/closed
    DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CREATE] = MajorFunctions;
    DriverObject->MajorFunction[IRP_MJ_CLOSE] = MajorFunctions;

    DbgPrint("Driver loaded");

    // subscribe to notifications
    PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(sCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, FALSE);
    PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine(sLoadImageNotifyRoutine);
    PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine(sCreateThreadNotifyRoutine);
    PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx(sCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx, FALSE);
    DbgPrint("Listeners isntalled..");

    IoCreateDevice(DriverObject, 0, &DEVICE_NAME, FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN, FALSE, &DriverObject->DeviceObject);
    if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
    {
        DbgPrint("Could not create device %wZ", DEVICE_NAME);
    }
    else 
    {
        DbgPrint("Device %wZ created", DEVICE_NAME);
    }

    status = IoCreateSymbolicLink(&DEVICE_SYMBOLIC_NAME, &DEVICE_NAME);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status))
    {
        DbgPrint("Symbolic link %wZ created", DEVICE_SYMBOLIC_NAME);
    }
    else
    {
        DbgPrint("Error creating symbolic link %wZ", DEVICE_SYMBOLIC_NAME);
    }

    return STATUS_SUCCESS;
}

References

PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx
PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine
PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine function (ntddk.h) - Windows driversdocsmsft
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PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine function (ntddk.h) - Windows driversdocsmsft
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PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine function (ntddk.h) - Windows driversdocsmsft
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