✍️
Red Teaming Experiments
  • What is this iRed.team?
  • Pinned
    • Pentesting Cheatsheets
      • SQL Injection & XSS Playground
    • Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse
      • From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
      • Kerberoasting
      • Kerberos: Golden Tickets
      • Kerberos: Silver Tickets
      • AS-REP Roasting
      • Kerberoasting: Requesting RC4 Encrypted TGS when AES is Enabled
      • Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Constrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Take Over
      • Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
      • DCShadow - Becoming a Rogue Domain Controller
      • DCSync: Dump Password Hashes from Domain Controller
      • PowerView: Active Directory Enumeration
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
      • Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
      • From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise
      • Pass the Hash with Machine$ Accounts
      • BloodHound with Kali Linux: 101
      • Backdooring AdminSDHolder for Persistence
      • Active Directory Enumeration with AD Module without RSAT or Admin Privileges
      • Enumerating AD Object Permissions with dsacls
      • Active Directory Password Spraying
  • offensive security
    • Red Team Infrastructure
      • HTTP Forwarders / Relays
      • SMTP Forwarders / Relays
      • Phishing with Modlishka Reverse HTTP Proxy
      • Automating Red Team Infrastructure with Terraform
      • Cobalt Strike 101
      • Powershell Empire 101
      • Spiderfoot 101 with Kali using Docker
    • Initial Access
      • Password Spraying Outlook Web Access: Remote Shell
      • Phishing with MS Office
        • Phishing: XLM / Macro 4.0
        • T1173: Phishing - DDE
        • T1137: Phishing - Office Macros
        • Phishing: OLE + LNK
        • Phishing: Embedded Internet Explorer
        • Phishing: .SLK Excel
        • Phishing: Replacing Embedded Video with Bogus Payload
        • Inject Macros from a Remote Dotm Template
        • Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections
        • Phishing: Embedded HTML Forms
      • Phishing with GoPhish and DigitalOcean
      • Forced Authentication
      • NetNTLMv2 hash stealing using Outlook
    • Code Execution
      • T1117: regsvr32
      • T1170: MSHTA
      • T1196: Control Panel Item
      • Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function
      • Code Execution through Control Panel Add-ins
      • T1191: CMSTP
      • T1118: InstallUtil
      • Using MSBuild to Execute Shellcode in C#
      • T1202: Forfiles Indirect Command Execution
      • Application Whitelisting Bypass with WMIC and XSL
      • Powershell Without Powershell.exe
      • Powershell Constrained Language Mode ByPass
      • Forcing Iexplore.exe to Load a Malicious DLL via COM Abuse
      • T1216: pubprn.vbs Signed Script Code Execution
    • Code & Process Injection
      • CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection
      • DLL Injection
      • Reflective DLL Injection
      • Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection
      • Process Doppelganging
      • Loading and Executing Shellcode From PE Resources
      • Process Hollowing and Portable Executable Relocations
      • APC Queue Code Injection
      • Early Bird APC Queue Code Injection
      • Shellcode Execution in a Local Process with QueueUserAPC and NtTestAlert
      • Shellcode Execution through Fibers
      • Shellcode Execution via CreateThreadpoolWait
      • Local Shellcode Execution without Windows APIs
      • Injecting to Remote Process via Thread Hijacking
      • SetWindowHookEx Code Injection
      • Finding Kernel32 Base and Function Addresses in Shellcode
      • Executing Shellcode with Inline Assembly in C/C++
      • Writing Custom Shellcode Encoders and Decoders
      • Backdooring PE Files with Shellcode
      • NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection
      • AddressOfEntryPoint Code Injection without VirtualAllocEx RWX
      • Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
      • PE Injection: Executing PEs inside Remote Processes
      • API Monitoring and Hooking for Offensive Tooling
      • Windows API Hooking
      • Import Adress Table (IAT) Hooking
      • DLL Injection via a Custom .NET Garbage Collector
      • Writing and Compiling Shellcode in C
      • Injecting .NET Assembly to an Unmanaged Process
    • Defense Evasion
      • AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries
      • Evading Windows Defender with 1 Byte Change
      • Bypassing Windows Defender: One TCP Socket Away From Meterpreter and Beacon Sessions
      • Bypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIs
      • Windows API Hashing in Malware
      • Detecting Hooked Syscalls
      • Calling Syscalls Directly from Visual Studio to Bypass AVs/EDRs
      • Retrieving ntdll Syscall Stubs from Disk at Run-time
      • Full DLL Unhooking with C++
      • Enumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code Injection
      • Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads
      • T1027: Obfuscated Powershell Invocations
      • Masquerading Processes in Userland via _PEB
      • Commandline Obfusaction
      • File Smuggling with HTML and JavaScript
      • T1099: Timestomping
      • T1096: Alternate Data Streams
      • T1158: Hidden Files
      • T1140: Encode/Decode Data with Certutil
      • Downloading Files with Certutil
      • T1045: Packed Binaries
      • Unloading Sysmon Driver
      • Bypassing IDS Signatures with Simple Reverse Shells
      • Preventing 3rd Party DLLs from Injecting into your Malware
      • ProcessDynamicCodePolicy: Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)
      • Parent Process ID (PPID) Spoofing
      • Executing C# Assemblies from Jscript and wscript with DotNetToJscript
    • Enumeration and Discovery
      • Windows Event IDs and Others for Situational Awareness
      • Enumerating COM Objects and their Methods
      • Enumerating Users without net, Services without sc and Scheduled Tasks without schtasks
      • Enumerating Windows Domains with rpcclient through SocksProxy == Bypassing Command Line Logging
      • Dump GAL from OWA
      • T1010: Application Window Discovery
      • T1087: Account Discovery & Enumeration
      • Using COM to Enumerate Hostname, Username, Domain, Network Drives
      • Detecting Sysmon on the Victim Host
    • Privilege Escalation
      • T1134: Primary Access Token Manipulation
      • Windows NamedPipes 101 + Privilege Escalation
      • T1038: DLL Hijacking
      • T1108: WebShells
      • T1183: Image File Execution Options Injection
      • Unquoted Service Paths
      • Pass The Hash: Privilege Escalation with Invoke-WMIExec
      • Environment Variable $Path Interception
      • Weak Service Permissions
    • Credential Access & Dumping
      • Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass Without Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass without Mimikatz with MiniDumpWriteDump
      • Dumping Hashes from SAM via Registry
      • Dumping SAM via esentutl.exe
      • Dumping LSA Secrets
      • Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy
      • Network vs Interactive Logons
      • Reading DPAPI Encrypted Secrets with Mimikatz and C++
      • T1214: Credentials in Registry
      • T1174: Password Filter
      • Forcing WDigest to Store Credentials in Plaintext
      • Dumping Delegated Default Kerberos and NTLM Credentials w/o Touching Lsass
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials via Custom Security Support Provider and Authentication Packages
      • Pulling Web Application Passwords by Hooking HTML Input Fields
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials by Hooking msv1_0!SpAcceptCredentials
      • Credentials Collection via CredUIPromptForCredentials
    • Lateral Movement
      • T1028: WinRM for Lateral Movement
      • WinRS for Lateral Movement
      • T1047: WMI for Lateral Movement
      • T1076: RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon
      • T1051: Shared Webroot
      • T1175: Lateral Movement via DCOM
      • WMI + MSI Lateral Movement
      • Lateral Movement via Service Configuration Manager
      • Lateral Movement via SMB Relaying
      • WMI + NewScheduledTaskAction Lateral Movement
      • WMI + PowerShell Desired State Configuration Lateral Movement
      • Simple TCP Relaying with NetCat
      • Empire Shells with NetNLTMv2 Relaying
      • Lateral Movement with Psexec
      • From Beacon to Interactive RDP Session
      • SSH Tunnelling / Port Forwarding
      • Lateral Movement via WMI Event Subscription
      • Lateral Movement via DLL Hijacking
      • Lateral Movement over headless RDP with SharpRDP
      • ShadowMove: Lateral Movement by Duplicating Existing Sockets
    • Persistence
      • DLL Proxying for Persistence
      • T1053: Schtask
      • T1035: Service Execution
      • T1015: Sticky Keys
      • T1136: Create Account
      • T1013: AddMonitor()
      • T1128: NetSh Helper DLL
      • T1084: Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation
        • WMI as a Data Storage
      • Windows Logon Helper
      • Hijacking Default File Extension
      • Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL
      • Modifying .lnk Shortcuts
      • T1180: Screensaver Hijack
      • T1138: Application Shimming
      • T1197: BITS Jobs
      • T1122: COM Hijacking
      • T1198: SIP & Trust Provider Hijacking
      • T1209: Hijacking Time Providers
      • T1130: Installing Root Certificate
      • Powershell Profile Persistence
      • RID Hijacking
      • Word Library Add-Ins
      • Office Templates
    • Exfiltration
      • Powershell Payload Delivery via DNS using Invoke-PowerCloud
  • reversing, forensics & misc
    • Windows Internals
      • Configuring Kernel Debugging Environment with kdnet and WinDBG Preview
      • Compiling a Simple Kernel Driver, DbgPrint, DbgView
      • Loading Windows Kernel Driver for Debugging
      • Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver
      • Listing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses
      • Sending Commands From Your Userland Program to Your Kernel Driver using IOCTL
      • Windows Kernel Drivers 101
      • x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT
      • Interrupt Descriptor Table - IDT
      • Token Abuse for Privilege Escalation in Kernel
      • Manipulating ActiveProcessLinks to Hide Processes in Userland
      • ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101
      • Exploring Injected Threads
      • Parsing PE File Headers with C++
      • Instrumenting Windows APIs with Frida
      • Exploring Process Environment Block
    • Cloud
      • AWS Accounts, Users, Groups, Roles, Policies
    • Neo4j
    • Dump Virtual Box Memory
    • AES Encryption Using Crypto++ .lib in Visual Studio C++
    • Reversing Password Checking Routine
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On this page
  • Overview
  • Problem (for Malware Developers)
  • Solution (for Malware Developers)
  • The Goal
  • Calculating the Hash
  • Resolving Address by Hash
  • Testing if CreateThread Works
  • References

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  1. offensive security
  2. Defense Evasion

Windows API Hashing in Malware

Evasion

PreviousBypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIsNextDetecting Hooked Syscalls

Last updated 4 years ago

Was this helpful?

The purpose of this lab is to get a bit more familiar with API Hashing - a technique employed by malware developers, that makes malware analysis a bit more difficult by hiding suspicious imported Windows APIs from the Import Address Table of the Portable Executable.

Overview

Problem (for Malware Developers)

If we have a PE with its IAT intact, it's relatively easy to get an idea of what the PE's capabilities are - i.e. if we see that the binary loads Ws2_32.dll, it's safe to assume that it contains some networking capabilities, or if we see a function RegCreateKeyEx being imported, we know that the binary has ability to modify the registry, etc.

Solution (for Malware Developers)

Malware authors want to make initial PE analysis/triage harder by simply looking at the IAT, and for this reason they may use API hashing to hide suspicious API calls from the IAT. This way, when an analyst runs the malicious binary through the strings utility or opens it in some PE parser, the Windows APIs that malware developer did not want the analyst to know without deeper analysis, will be hidden.

Assume we have written some malware called api-hashing.exe that usesCreateThread:

If we compile the above code and inspect it via a PE parser, we see that there are 28 imported functions from kernel32 library and CreateThread is one of them:

For some reason, we decide that we do not want malware analysts to know that our malware will be calling CreateThread just by looking at the binary's IAT/running strings against the binary. To achieve this, we can employ the API hashing technique and resolve CreateThread function address at runtime. By doing this, we can make the CreateThread disappear from the PE's IAT, and this is exactly the purpose of this lab - to see how this techique works in real life.

The Goal

In this lab we're going to write:

  1. A simple powershell script that will calculate a hash for a given function name. For example, feeding a string CreateThread to the script will spit out its representation as a hash value, which in our lab, as we will see later, will be 0x00544e304

  2. A simple C program that will resolve CreateThread function's virtual address inside the api-hashing.exe by iterating through all the exported function names of kernel32 module (where CreateThread lives), calculating their hashes (using our hashing algoritm) and comparing them to our hash 0x00544e304 (for CreateThread). In our case, the program will spit out a virtual address 00007FF89DAFB5A0 as will be seen later.

Visually, the process of what we are going to do looks something like this:

Calculating the Hash

API hashing is simply an arbitrary (that we can make up on our own) function / algorithm, that calculates a hash value for a given text string.

In our case, we defined the hashing algorithm to work like this:

  1. Take the function name to be hashed (i.e CreateThread)

  2. Convert the string to a char array

  3. Set a variable $hash to any initial value. In our case, we chose 0x35 - no particular reason - as mentioned earlier, hash calculation can be any arbitrary algorithm of your choice - as long as we can reliably create hashes without collisions, meaning that no two different API calls will result in the same hash value.

  4. Iterate through each character and perform the following arithmetics - hash calculation

    1. Convert character to a hex representation

    2. Perform the following arithmetics $hash += $hash * 0xab10f29f + $c -band 0xffffff, where:

      1. 0xab10f29f is simply another random value of our choice

      2. $c is a hex representation of the character from the function we're hashing

      3. -band 0xffffff is for masking off the high order bits of the hash value

  5. Spit out the hash representation for the string CreateThread

Our hashing function has not been tested for hash collisions and is only meant to demonstrate the idea behind it. In fact, YoavLevi informed me that this function indeed causes hash collisions for at least these two APIs: `GetStdHandle 0x006426be5

CloseHandle 0x006426be5`

$APIsToHash = @("CreateThread")

$APIsToHash | % {
    $api = $_

    $hash = 0x35
    [int]$i = 0

    $api.ToCharArray() | % {
        $l = $_
        $c = [int64]$l
        $c = '0x{0:x}' -f $c
        $hash += $hash * 0xab10f29f + $c -band 0xffffff
        $hashHex = '0x{0:x}' -f $hash
        $i++
        write-host "Iteration $i : $l : $c : $hashHex"
    }
    write-host "$api`t $('0x00{0:x}' -f $hash)"
}

If we run the hashing function against the string CreateThread, we get its hash - 0x00544e304:

We are now ready to move on to the C program that will resolve CreateThread function address by parsing out the Kernel32 module's Export Address Table and tell us where CreateThread function is stored in our malicious process's memory, based on the hash we've just calculated - 0x00544e304.

Resolving Address by Hash

Our C program will have 2 functions:

getHashFromString - a function that calculates a hash for a given string. This is an identital function (related to the hash calculation) to the one that we wrote earlier for hashing our function name CreateThread in Powershell.

On the left is the getHashFromString in our C program and on the right is the powershell version of the hash calculation algorithm:

getFunctionAddressByHash - this is the function that will take a hash value (0x00544e304 in our case for CreateThread) as an argument and return function's, that maps back to that hash, virtual address - 00007FF89DAFB5A0 in our case.

This function at a high level works like this:

  1. Get a base address of the library where our function of interest (CreateThread) resides, which is - kernel32.dll in our case

  2. Locates kernel32 Export Address Table

  3. Iterates through each exported function name by the kernel32 module

  4. For each exported function name, calculates its hash value using the getHashFromString

  5. If calculated hash equals 0x00544e304 (CreateThread), calculate function's virtual address

  6. At this point, we could typedef the CreateThread function prototype, point it to the resolved address in step 5 and use it for creating new threads, but this time without CreateThread being shown in our malware PE's Import Address Table!

Below is our aforementioned C program that resolves CreateThread function address by the hash (0x00544e304):

#include <iostream>
#include <Windows.h>

DWORD getHashFromString(char *string) 
{
    size_t stringLength = strnlen_s(string, 50);
    DWORD hash = 0x35;

    for (size_t i = 0; i < stringLength; i++)
    {
        hash += (hash * 0xab10f29f + string[i]) & 0xffffff;
    }
    // printf("%s: 0x00%x\n", string, hash);

    return hash;
}

PDWORD getFunctionAddressByHash(char *library, DWORD hash)
{
    PDWORD functionAddress = (PDWORD)0;

    // Get base address of the module in which our exported function of interest resides (kernel32 in the case of CreateThread)
    HMODULE libraryBase = LoadLibraryA(library);

    PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER dosHeader = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)libraryBase;
    PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS imageNTHeaders = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)((DWORD_PTR)libraryBase + dosHeader->e_lfanew);

    DWORD_PTR exportDirectoryRVA = imageNTHeaders->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_EXPORT].VirtualAddress;

    PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY imageExportDirectory = (PIMAGE_EXPORT_DIRECTORY)((DWORD_PTR)libraryBase + exportDirectoryRVA);

    // Get RVAs to exported function related information
    PDWORD addresOfFunctionsRVA = (PDWORD)((DWORD_PTR)libraryBase + imageExportDirectory->AddressOfFunctions);
    PDWORD addressOfNamesRVA = (PDWORD)((DWORD_PTR)libraryBase + imageExportDirectory->AddressOfNames);
    PWORD addressOfNameOrdinalsRVA = (PWORD)((DWORD_PTR)libraryBase + imageExportDirectory->AddressOfNameOrdinals);

    // Iterate through exported functions, calculate their hashes and check if any of them match our hash of 0x00544e304 (CreateThread)
    // If yes, get its virtual memory address (this is where CreateThread function resides in memory of our process)
    for (DWORD i = 0; i < imageExportDirectory->NumberOfFunctions; i++)
    {
        DWORD functionNameRVA = addressOfNamesRVA[i];
        DWORD_PTR functionNameVA = (DWORD_PTR)libraryBase + functionNameRVA;
        char* functionName = (char*)functionNameVA;
        DWORD_PTR functionAddressRVA = 0;

        // Calculate hash for this exported function
        DWORD functionNameHash = getHashFromString(functionName);

        // If hash for CreateThread is found, resolve the function address
        if (functionNameHash == hash)
        {
            functionAddressRVA = addresOfFunctionsRVA[addressOfNameOrdinalsRVA[i]];
            functionAddress = (PDWORD)((DWORD_PTR)libraryBase + functionAddressRVA);
            printf("%s : 0x%x : %p\n", functionName, functionNameHash, functionAddress);
            return functionAddress;
        }
    }
}

// Define CreateThread function prototype
using customCreateThread = HANDLE(NTAPI*)(
    LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES   lpThreadAttributes,
    SIZE_T                  dwStackSize,
    LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE  lpStartAddress,
    __drv_aliasesMem LPVOID lpParameter,
    DWORD                   dwCreationFlags,
    LPDWORD                 lpThreadId
);

int main()
{
    // Resolve CreateThread address by hash
    PDWORD functionAddress = getFunctionAddressByHash((char *)"kernel32", 0x00544e304);

    // Point CreateThread function pointer to the CreateThread virtual address resolved by its hash
    customCreateThread CreateThread = (customCreateThread)functionAddress;
    DWORD tid = 0;

    // Call CreateThread
    HANDLE th = CreateThread(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tid);

    return 1;
}

If we compile and run the code, we will see the following:

...where from left to right:

  1. CreateThread - function name that was resolved for the given hash 0x00544e304

  2. 0x00544e304 - hash that was used to resolve the said CreateThread function name

  3. 00007FF89DAFB5A0 - CreateThread virtual memory address inside our api-hashing.exe process

Below image confirms that 00007FF89DAFB5A0 is indeed pointing to the CreateThread inside api-hashing.exe:

...and more importantly, its IAT is now free from CreateThread:

Testing if CreateThread Works

Below shows that we can now successfully call CreateThread which was resolved at run time by hash 0x00544e304 - this is confirmed by the obtained handle 0x84 to the newly created thread:

Below also shows the thread ID that was created during our CreateThread invokation:

References

For more information on parsing PE executables, see .

Parsing PE File Headers with C++
IAT intact - CreateThread exposed
CreateThread is hashed to 0x00544e304
API hashing in C and Powershell
CreateThread memory address successuflly resolved by the hash
IAT is tampered with - CreateThread is gone
API-Hashing in the Sodinokibi/REvil Ransomware &#8211; Why and How?nullteilerfrei
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